The party congress of the SPD in Berlin on 4th December 2011, first published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Germany in and with and for Europe
.........
The European Union is necessary
In the 1960s and early 1970s, de Gaulle and Pompidou continued the process of European integration – not because they wanted to draw their own country in, for better or worse, but in order to bind Germany in. Subsequently, the good relationship I enjoyed with Giscard d’Estaing resulted in a period of Franco-German cooperation and the continuation of Euro-pean integration – a period that was successfully resumed by Mitterand and Kohl after the spring of 1990. Between 1950/52 and 1991 the European Community grew little by little from six to twelve Member States.
Thanks to the extensive preparatory work carried out by Jacques Delors (then President of the European Commission), Mitterand and Kohl were able to launch the common currency – the euro – in Maastricht in 1991, which was introduced ten years later in 2001. Here again, the underlying cause was the French concern about an over-powerful Germany or, to be more precise, an over-powerful deutschmark.
In the meantime the euro has become the second most important currency in the global economy. Both internally and externally this European currency has so far proved more stable than the U.S. dollar – and more stable than the deutschmark in the last ten years of its exist-ence. All that has been written and said about an alleged ›crisis of the euro‹ is irresponsible nonsense uttered by the media, journalists and politicians.
The world has changed dramatically since Maastricht in 1991/92, however. We have witnessed the liberation of the countries of Eastern Europe and the implosion of the Soviet Union. We have experienced the phenomenal rise of China, India, Brazil and other ›emerging economies‹, which used to be sweepingly referred to as the ›Third World‹. In addition, the real economies in most parts of the world have been ›globalised‹. In other words, almost all the countries in the world are dependent on each other. Players in the globalised financial markets, in particular, have acquired a power that, for the time being, remains completely uncontrolled.
At the same time the world’s population has soared almost unnoticed to seven billion. When I was born, there were just two billion people in the world. All these enormous changes are having a tremendous impact on the peoples of Europe, their countries and their prosperity.
On the other hand, all the European countries are ageing and their populations are shrinking. By the middle of the 21st century there will probably be as many as nine billion people on the planet. The European nations together will then account for just seven per cent of the world’s population. Seven percent of nine billion! For more than two centuries – up to the year 1950 – Europeans made up over twenty per cent of the global population. But for the past fifty years we Europeans have been shrinking in numbers, not just in absolute figures but also, and above all, compared to Asia, Africa and Latin America. Similarly, the Europeans’ share of the global national product, i.e. the value added of the world’s population, is shrinking. By 2050 it will drop to around ten per cent; in 1950 it was still at around thirty per cent.
In 2050, each of the European nations will constitute just a fraction of one per cent of the world’s population. In other words, if we cherish the notion that we Europeans are important for the world, we have to act in unison. As individual states – France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Holland, Denmark or Greece – we will ultimately be measured not in percentages, but in parts per thousand.
That is why the European nation states have a long-term strategic interest in their mutual in-tegration. This strategic interest in European integration will become increasingly significant. As yet, the countries are mostly unaware of the fact. Their governments have failed to make it clear to them.
Should the European Union fail to ensure its capacity to take common action in the decades ahead, however limited that might be, a self-inflicted marginalisation of the European coun-tries and of European civilisation cannot be ruled out. If this happens, a revival of competition between the countries of Europe and of battles for prestige cannot be excluded either. If that were the case, the integration of Germany could hardly continue. The old game between the centre and the periphery might well be resumed.
The process of global enlightenment, the spread of human rights and human dignity as well as of constitutional and democratic government would no longer receive any effective impe-tus from Europe. Taking these aspects into consideration, the European Community emerges as a vital necessity for the nation states of our old continent. This necessity goes beyond the motives that inspired Churchill and de Gaulle. It goes beyond the motives demonstrated by Monnet and Adenauer as well. Today, it also overarches the motives of Ernst Reuter, Fritz Erler, Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl.
I would add that one of the issues at stake here is still undoubtedly to bind Germany in. For that reason we Germans must be quite clear in our minds about the tasks we have to address and our own role in the context of European integration.
Πηγή: Pro Europa
The European Union is necessary
In the 1960s and early 1970s, de Gaulle and Pompidou continued the process of European integration – not because they wanted to draw their own country in, for better or worse, but in order to bind Germany in. Subsequently, the good relationship I enjoyed with Giscard d’Estaing resulted in a period of Franco-German cooperation and the continuation of Euro-pean integration – a period that was successfully resumed by Mitterand and Kohl after the spring of 1990. Between 1950/52 and 1991 the European Community grew little by little from six to twelve Member States.
Thanks to the extensive preparatory work carried out by Jacques Delors (then President of the European Commission), Mitterand and Kohl were able to launch the common currency – the euro – in Maastricht in 1991, which was introduced ten years later in 2001. Here again, the underlying cause was the French concern about an over-powerful Germany or, to be more precise, an over-powerful deutschmark.
In the meantime the euro has become the second most important currency in the global economy. Both internally and externally this European currency has so far proved more stable than the U.S. dollar – and more stable than the deutschmark in the last ten years of its exist-ence. All that has been written and said about an alleged ›crisis of the euro‹ is irresponsible nonsense uttered by the media, journalists and politicians.
The world has changed dramatically since Maastricht in 1991/92, however. We have witnessed the liberation of the countries of Eastern Europe and the implosion of the Soviet Union. We have experienced the phenomenal rise of China, India, Brazil and other ›emerging economies‹, which used to be sweepingly referred to as the ›Third World‹. In addition, the real economies in most parts of the world have been ›globalised‹. In other words, almost all the countries in the world are dependent on each other. Players in the globalised financial markets, in particular, have acquired a power that, for the time being, remains completely uncontrolled.
At the same time the world’s population has soared almost unnoticed to seven billion. When I was born, there were just two billion people in the world. All these enormous changes are having a tremendous impact on the peoples of Europe, their countries and their prosperity.
On the other hand, all the European countries are ageing and their populations are shrinking. By the middle of the 21st century there will probably be as many as nine billion people on the planet. The European nations together will then account for just seven per cent of the world’s population. Seven percent of nine billion! For more than two centuries – up to the year 1950 – Europeans made up over twenty per cent of the global population. But for the past fifty years we Europeans have been shrinking in numbers, not just in absolute figures but also, and above all, compared to Asia, Africa and Latin America. Similarly, the Europeans’ share of the global national product, i.e. the value added of the world’s population, is shrinking. By 2050 it will drop to around ten per cent; in 1950 it was still at around thirty per cent.
In 2050, each of the European nations will constitute just a fraction of one per cent of the world’s population. In other words, if we cherish the notion that we Europeans are important for the world, we have to act in unison. As individual states – France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Holland, Denmark or Greece – we will ultimately be measured not in percentages, but in parts per thousand.
That is why the European nation states have a long-term strategic interest in their mutual in-tegration. This strategic interest in European integration will become increasingly significant. As yet, the countries are mostly unaware of the fact. Their governments have failed to make it clear to them.
Should the European Union fail to ensure its capacity to take common action in the decades ahead, however limited that might be, a self-inflicted marginalisation of the European coun-tries and of European civilisation cannot be ruled out. If this happens, a revival of competition between the countries of Europe and of battles for prestige cannot be excluded either. If that were the case, the integration of Germany could hardly continue. The old game between the centre and the periphery might well be resumed.
The process of global enlightenment, the spread of human rights and human dignity as well as of constitutional and democratic government would no longer receive any effective impe-tus from Europe. Taking these aspects into consideration, the European Community emerges as a vital necessity for the nation states of our old continent. This necessity goes beyond the motives that inspired Churchill and de Gaulle. It goes beyond the motives demonstrated by Monnet and Adenauer as well. Today, it also overarches the motives of Ernst Reuter, Fritz Erler, Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl.
I would add that one of the issues at stake here is still undoubtedly to bind Germany in. For that reason we Germans must be quite clear in our minds about the tasks we have to address and our own role in the context of European integration.
Πηγή: Pro Europa